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The Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse Under Louisiana Civil
Code Article 890 and the Legitime of the Decedent's
Children by a Prior Marriage
William T.F. Dykes"
Frederick R. Parker, Jr.**
Considerable confusion has followed the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Succession of Lauga,1 which held the Louisiana Legislature's recent
attempts to revise the forced heirship provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code
unconstitutional.2 Much of this confusion has arisen from the ancillary effects of
Lauga and its companion case, Succession of Terry,3 reviving Louisiana Civil
Code article 1752, which the legislature had sought to expressly repeal in 1990 as
part of its forced heirship revision.4 Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the Lauga
and Terry decisions concerns the ability of a testator, who is survived by
descendants of a prior marriage, either (1) to confirm by testament the usufruct
authorized by Louisiana Civil Code article 890 with respect to his interest in
community property or (2) to bequeath the usufruct authorized by that article with
respect to his separate property.5 The scope of the testator's authority to confirm
or grant such a usufruct is of significant moment to members of the bar engaged in
Copyright 1994, by LOUIsIANA LAW REvIEw.
* Member, Louisiana, Maryland, and Texas Bars; BBA, Baylor University; JD, University of
Texas; LLM, New York University.
** Member, Louisiana Bar; BA. MBA, Northeast Louisiana University; JD, Louisiana State
University; LLM, New York University; Member, Louisiana Law Review (LSU Law Class of 1987).
1. 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993).
2. 1990 La. Acts No. 147; 1989 La. Acts No. 788.
3. 624 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1993).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 1752 (1870) provides:
A man or woman who contracts a second or subsequent marriage, having a child or
children by a former marriage, can give to his wife, or she to her husband, either by
donation inter vivos or by last will and testament, in full ownership or in usufruct, all of
that portion of his estate, or her estate, as the case may be, that he or she could legally
give to a stranger.
5. La. Civ. Code art. 890 provides:
If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants and shall not have disposed by
testament of his share in the community property, the surviving spouse shall have a legal
usufruct over so much of that share as may be inherited by the descendants. This usufruct
terminates when the surviving spouse contracts another marriage, unless confirmed by
testament for life or for a shorter period.
The deceased may by testament grant a usufruct for life or for a shorter period to the
surviving spouse over all or part of his separate property.
A usufruct authorized by this Article is to be treated as a legal usufruct and is not an
impingement upon legitime.
If the usufruct authorized by this Article affects the rights of heirs other than children
of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving spouse or affects separate
property, security may be requested by the naked owner.
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Louisiana estate planning, particularly in light of the analysis employed by the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Succession of Suggs.6
The decedent in Suggs was survived by his wife and six children, three by his
marriage to the surviving spouse and three by a prior marriage. Because the
decedent and his surviving spouse had entered into a prenuptial agreement
establishing a separate property regime, the decedent's entire estate consisted of
separate property. In his will, the decedent bequeathed most of the disposable
portion of his estate to his wife. He also granted her the usufruct over the forced
portion, the naked ownership of which he left in trust for the benefit of his six
surviving children, each of whom was designated as the principal beneficiary of a
separate trust. The decedent named his wife as income beneficiary and trustee of
each trust and granted to her, as trustee, broad powers over the trust corpus without
the necessity of furnishing security.'
The children of the decedent's prior marriage filed a declaratory judgment
action in which they claimed the legacy to their step-mother, as usufructuary, was
excessive and impinged upon their legitime. The Suggs court, therefore, was faced
with the novel issue of how to resolve the apparent conflict between Louisiana Civil
Code article 1752, which sets forth certain rules governing the extent to which one
spouse may make a gift or bequest to the other when the donor has children of a
prior marriage, and Article 890, which sets forth the rules governing the legal
usufruct of a surviving spouse.8
Because the testator in Suggs owned only separate property, the court's
analysis focused on the second and third paragraphs of Article 890, which provide:
The deceased may by testament grant a usufruct for life or for a
shorter period to the surviving spouse over all or part of his separate
property.
A usufruct authorized by this Article is to be treated as a legal
usufruct and is not an impingement upon legitime. 9
The court compared these provisions with those of Article 1752:
A man or woman who contracts a second or subsequent marriage,
having a child or children by a former marriage, can give to his wife, or
6. 612 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992). The court's analysis in Suggs would be moot had
Act 147 of the 1990 Louisiana Legislature been able to withstand scrutiny under the Louisiana
Constitution, because that act would have expressly repealed Article 1752 in its entirety. But see
Succession of Becker, No. 91-17708 (La. Dist. Ct. Orl. April 20, 1994), in which the court reached
a different result than the Suggs court and concluded that Article 1752 does not limit the scope of
the Article 890 usufruct. The Becker decision is pending now before the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal.
7. Suggs, 612 So. 2d at 298.
8. The issue before the Suggs court was limited to the proper statutory construction of La. Civ.
Code arts. 890 and 1752. No constitutional issue was raised. See Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d
1156, 1167 (La. 1993).
9. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
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she to her husband, either by donation inter vivos or by last will and
testament, in full property or in usufruct, all of that portion of his estate,
or her estate, as the case may be, that he or she could legally give to a
stranger.10
The court then sought to reconcile "the apparently conflicting provisions" of
these two articles in the following terms:
A plain reading of the articles indicates that a decedent may leave a
usufruct over the forced portion of his estate to the surviving spouse of
his first marriage, but if there are children of a first marriage, he cannot
give such a usufruct to the surviving spouse of a second or subsequent
marriage."
Finding that "the provisions of Article 890 are not contrary to or irreconcilable
with the provisions of Article 1752," the court invoked the rule of statutory
construction which dictates that, whenever possible, effect should be given to all
provisions of law regarding the same subject matter.' The court thus rejected
the surviving spouse's argument that the enactment of Louisiana Civil Code
article 890 in effect repealed Article 1752."
Unfortunately, while the analysis applied by the Suggs court avoided a
construction which would have treated either article as mere surplusage, it did
so at the expense of the clearest expression of legislative intent regarding the
scope of the Article 890 usufruct. 4 Further, the Suggs analysis would preclude
the availability of the unlimited federal estate tax marital deduction with respect
to that portion of the decedent's estate which represents the legitime of heirs who
are issue of a prior marriage."
This article questions the soundness of the Suggs analysis and proposes two
complementary theories which lead to the conclusion that Article 1752 was
rendered moot as long ago as 1916 and that it was repealed by implication
10. La. Civ. Code art. 1752 (1870).
11. Suggs, 612 So. 2d at 298. Apparently, because the children who brought the declaratory
judgment action in Suggs were legitimate issue of the decedent's prior marriage, the court did not
address the effect which its decision might have on the legitime of any illegitimate issue.
12. Id
13. Id at 299.
14. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
15. To be eligible for the election to claim the federal estate tax marital deduction under §
2056(b)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "I.R.C."), the decedent's surviving
spouse must have a "qualifying income interest for life." The decedent's surviving spouse has such
an interest if he or she is entitled to all of the income from the property, payable annually or at more
frequent intervals, or has a usufruct interest for life in the property, and no person has a power to
appoint any part of the property to any person other than the surviving spouse. I.R.C. §
2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1988). The marital deduction also would be denied with respect to that portion
of the decedent's estate which represents the legitime of the decedent's illegitimate issue, if the Suggs
analysis were to extend that far.
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through the 1981 and 1982 legislative acts affecting Article 916 and its
successor, Article 890. The proposed analysis would also sustain the tax
consequences which practitioners generally expect to arise from any testamentary
confirmation or granting of a usufruct established for the lifetime of a surviving
spouse. 6
I. THE Two MISSING LINKS IN THE SUGGS ANALYSIS
As noted above, the Suggs court attempted to resolve the apparent conflict
between Articles 890 and 1752 of the Louisiana Civil Code by applying Article
1752 as a limitation upon the scope of the usufruct otherwise authorized by
Article 890."7 In effect, the court concluded that Article 1752 prohibited the
decedent from granting to his surviving spouse a usufruct over that portion of his
separate property which constituted the legitime of his children by a prior
marriage.' Although the Suggs analysis gave effect to the established principle
of statutory construction that laws regarding the same subject matter generally
should be construed so as to render them consistent, it ignored the significance
of Article 1752's historical development as well as the consequences which flow
as a matter of law from the characterization of the Article 890 usufruct as legal
in nature. A perpetuation of the Suggs analysis also would defeat the express
legislative intent underlying the 1981 and 1982 legislative acts which extended
the scope of the surviving spouse's usufruct.' 9
A. A Statutory and Historical Analysis of Louisiana Civil Code Articles 890
and 1752
A statutory and an historical analysis of Louisiana Civil Code articles 890
and 1752 reveals two significant facts which, together, lead to the conclusion that
Article 1752 does not constrict the scope of the Article 890 usufruct. First, a
16. Many practitioners had assumed that a testator had the power to confirm (with respect to
community property) or to grant by testament (with respect to separate property) an Aqicle 890
usufruct for the lifetime of the surviving spouse over all of his interest in property, whether
community or separate, and irrespective of whether he had descendants of a prior marriage.
Similarly, many also had assumed that an income interest for the lifetime of the surviving spouse in
a trust containing the legitime of the decedent's forced heirs, whether or not of the marriage to his
surviving spouse, was also possible under Louisiana law. The Suggs analysis would preclude any
such lifetime usufruct or income interest with respect to the portion of the decedent's estate which
constitutes the legitime of descendants not of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving
spouse, and would preclude, to that extent, eligibility for the unlimited federal estate tax marital
deduction. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1988). See supra note 15.
17. Succession of Suggs, 612 So. 2d 297, 298 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
18. The natural extension of the Suggs analysis would lead to the proscription of the Article 890
usufruct, even with respect to community property. See the hypothetical situation discussed infra
notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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statutory analysis reveals that these articles deal with different areas of the law
which, under the Suggs view, would interact in a most perplexing way. Second,
a review of the respective histories of Articles 890 and 1752 reveals that Article
1752 was rendered moot as long ago as 1916. Finally, these combined analyses
lead to the conclusion that Article 1752 was implicitly repealed by the enactment
of Article 890 in 1981.
1. Statutory Analysis
A simple analysis of the codal scheme itself reveals that the Suggs court
erroneously construed Article 1752 as imposing a limitation on the scope of the
Article 890 usufruct. It is significant that, while both Articles 890 and 1752 are
found in Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code, which deals with the different
modes of acquiring ownership of things, they are set forth in different titles
dealing with distinct areas of the law. Article 890 is set forth as a part of Title
I, Chapter 2, dealing with intestate successions. Article 1752, on the other hand,
is set forth in Title II, Chapter 9, which sets forth the rules governing donations
between married persons. Thus, in contrast with Article 890, Article 1752
applies only to donations, which do not arise by operation of law, but which are
conventional and therefore are subject to restrictions designed to further society's
interest in protecting the legitime of a testator's children by a prior marriage.
t2
20. Of course, this discussion is limited to usufructs which are created by testament (a donation
morris causa, which is a conventional act). The authors thus admit this statement, at least to some
extent, begs the question. Nevertheless, the fact that the codal authority for such a usufruct is set
forth in the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with intestacy speaks volumes.
Admittedly, it is anomalous that a legal usufruct may be created in certain cases only by way of a
conventional act (one might infer that much of the confusion inherent in the Suggs analysis stemmed
from that which surrounds the blending of these legal and contractual concepts). See infra notes 26-
43 and accompanying text (regarding the history of Louisiana Civil Code articles 890 and 1752) and
infra notes 52-63 (regarding the consequences which attend the characterization of an Article 890
usufruct as one arising by operation of law). Further, the security provided in the last paragraph of
Article 890 and in La. Code Civ. P. art. 3154.1 arguably protects society's interests concerning the
conventional transmission of wealth. In this vein, it is interesting to note the Suggs court's assertion
that its construction would promote the policy of protecting the children of a first marriage from
effectively being disinherited in favor of a spouse of a second or subsequent marriage. Suggs, 612
So. 2d at 298. This conclusion ignores the fact that the fourth paragraph of Article 890 and Article
3154.1 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provide a sure-fire means for heirs who are not
children of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving spouse to protect their interests from
waste. Article 3154.1, as originally enacted by Act 919 of 1981, and its accompanying comment
provide as follows:
Art. 3154.1. Request by naked owners other than children of the marriage for security
from surviving spouse
If the former community or separate property of a decedent is burdened with a usufruct
in favor of his surviving spouse, successors to that property, other than children of the
decedent's marriage with the survivor, may request security in accordance with the




The codal scheme itself thus clearly indicates that Articles 890 and 1752
deal with two separate, albeit somewhat related, areas of the law. While Article
890 is included among the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code which provide
for the legal regime for succession to a decedent's property, Article 1752 was
included among the provisions which set forth the rules governing the decedent's
right to arrange for his own succession.2" Thus, Article 1752 was included
among the rules that to further society's interests in the transmission of wealth,
set limits upon a person's right to dispose of his property by either donation inter
vivos or mortis causa. Accordingly, and contrary to the Suggs conclusion,
Article 1752 should have no bearing upon the legal regime of which the Article
890 usufruct is an integral component.
A simple example illustrates that, by superimposing the rules of Article 1752
over those of Article 890, the Suggs analysis is in direct conflict with the codal
scheme and in effect would reverse the natural ordering of the law and provide
greater rights under the laws of intestacy than are available under the law
governing testamentary dispositions.22 Consider the following hypothetical
situation. H was formerly married to W-1 but was married to W-2 at the time
of his death. H is survived only by W-2 and C, his child from the prior
marriage. Assuming H died intestate (and without sufficient separate property
to satisfy C's legitime), his property would devolve as follows: C would inherit
H's separate property in full ownership; C also would inherit the naked
ownership of H's one-half interest in the community property, subject to W-2's
usufruct under Article 890.23 While this result would obtain by operation of
law in an intestate setting, the Suggs analysis would compel a different
conclusion had H sought the same result by testament. Under that analysis, W-
2's usufruct would constitute an impingement upon C's legitime. Accordingly,
C would have the option, set forth in Louisiana Civil Code article 1499, either
to accept H's one-half interest in the community subject to the usufruct, or to
Comment
This article is intended to provide a procedure for the request for security by naked
owners of community property other than children of the marriage with the survivor, or
by naked owners of separate property, as against the surviving spouse.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 3154.1 & cmt.
21. Professor Yiannopoulos recognized this distinction, noting:
The usufruct of the surviving spouse under Article 890 of the Louisiana Civil Code
attaches by operation of law to the share of the deceased spouse in the community of
acquets and gains in case of intestacy, that is when the deceased ".. shall not have
disposed by testament of his share in the community."
A.N. Yiannopoulos, Personal Servitudes § 192, at 387, in 3 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed.
1989) (first emphasis added) (quoting La. Civ. Code art. 890).
22. This example illustrates the unavoidable conflict between Articles 890 and 1752 which the
Suggs analysis not only fails to resolve, but actually accentuates. See infra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text for a discussion concerning the implicit repeal of Article 1752 by the enactment
of Article 890.
23. This usufruct would terminate upon W-2's remarriage, at which time C would become full
owner. See the first paragraph of La. Civ. Code art. 890.
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relinquish to W-2 the disposable portion of H's estate.' The Article 1499
option would not arise in the intestate setting, however, simply because the
application of that option turns upon the existence of a donation by the decedent,
whether inter vivos or mortis causa. Thus the Suggs analysis, by giving to a
legatee under a will an option not otherwise available to an heir under the law,
would deny the testator the right to do what the law itself would dictate in the
absence of any contrary expression of his will.' This would produce an odd
result, indeed, given the theory behind the law of intestacy as an inferential
grafting into the law of the presumed will of those who die intestate. The Suggs
analysis is perplexing and problematic in this sense.
2. Historical Analysis
An historical analysis of Articles 890 and 1752 confirms the deduction that
Article 1752 does not limit the scope of the Article 890 usufruct. According to
Louisiana Civil Code article 1746:
One of the married couple may, either by marriage contract or
during the marriage, give to the other, in full property, all that he or she
might give to a stranger.
26
This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions which restrict a
spouse's right to alienate his patrimony. One example of these restrictive
provisions is Article 1752, which, as originally enacted, provided that a person
with children by a former marriage could give to his present spouse only the
usufruct of a child's share, limited to one-fifth of the donor's estate. Article
1752 was amended in 1882 to permit one spouse to give to the other, in full
24. La. Civ. Code art. 1499 provides:
If the disposition made by donation inter vivos or mortis causa, be of a usufruct, or of
an annuity, the value of which exceeds the disposable portion, the forced heirs have the
option, either to execute the disposition or to abandon to the donee the ownership of such
portion of the estate as the donor had a right to dispose of.
Although a literal reading of Article 1499 would restrict the availability of this option to
circumstances where the complaining heir is able to establish that the usufruct is of greater value than
the disposable portion, it has been suggested by French commentators and by courts construing the
provisions of the Code Civil which correspond to Article 1499, that the option is available without
regard to the usufruct's value. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term, 34 La. L. Rev. 207, 215 n.46 (1974), and the authorities
cited therein.
25. This inconsistency could be avoided only by extending application of the Suggs analysis to
the intestate setting. Such an extension, however, would conflict with the clear import of Article 890.
26. La. Civ. Code art. 1746.
27. La. Civ. Code art. 1752 (1870), as originally enacted, provided:
A man or a woman, who contracts a second or subsequent marriage, having children by
a former one, can give to his wife, or she to her husband, only the least child's portion,
and that only as a usufruct; and in no case shall the portion, of which the donee is to have
the usufruct, exceed the fifth part of the donor's estate.
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property or in usufruct, one-third of his or her property.' Article 1752 was last
amended in 1916 to provide that a spouse who has children by a prior marriage
may give to his or her present spouse "in full ownership or in usufruct, all of
that portion of his [or her] estate ... that he or she could legally give to a
stranger."29
Professor Lazarus described the changing effect of Article 1752 in these
terms:
[I]nstead of being governed by article 1493 of the Civil Code, the
disposable quantum was subject to the limitations of article 1752, so
that where the donor or testator having children by a former marriage
made a donation in favor of his wife, the donation could, at the option
of the children, be reduced to one-third of the donor's property either
in full ownership or in usufruct. The 1916 amendment of article 1752
which increased the disposable quantum to the portion which can legally
be given to a stranger, has now eliminated the problem in this respect,
but only as to the quantum. The article still provides that this dispos-
able portion can be given only in "full property or in usufruct."'
Professor Lazarus went on to suggest that, in lieu of the Article 1499 option to
reduce a disposition to a surviving spouse in usufruct over the legitime, children
of a prior marriage might be able to insist on a reduction of the disposition either
to the disposable portion in full ownership or to a usufruct on that portion. The
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this possibility in Succession of Hyde,3,
however, and described the language "in full property or in usufruct" as merely
"a remnant of the legislation as first enacted, and is now apparently inconsequen-
tial for it merely gives the donor the right of doing what he has the faculty of
doing anyhow, that is, disposing of the disposable portion in any manner he sees
fit."'32 By emphasizing that the "in full property or in usufruct" language of
28. La. Civ. Code art. 1752 (1870), as amended by 1882 La. Acts No. 13, provided:
A man or a woman, who contracts a second or subsequent marriage, having children by
a former one, can give to his wife, or she to her husband either by donation or by last will
and testament, in full property, or in usufruct, not exceeding one-third of his or her
property.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1752 (1870), as amended by 1916 La. Acts No. 16, provided:
A man or woman who contracts a second or subsequent marriage, having a child or
children by a former marriage, can give to his wife, or she to her husband, either by
donation inter vivos or by last will and testament, in full ownership or in usufruct, all of
that portion of his estate, or her estate, as the case may be, that he or she could legally
give to a stranger.
30. Carlos E. Lazarus, Successions and Donations, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1962-1963 Term, 24 La. L. Rev. 184, 188-89 (1964).
31. 292 So. 2d 693 (La. 1974).
32. Id. at 695. It is interesting to note that the court cited Professor Lazarus in support of this
conclusion. See Carlos E. Lazarus, Successions and Donations, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1967-1968 Term, 29 La. L. Rev. 193, 197 n.17 (1969). This work indicates that
[Vol. 55
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Article 1752 merely restates the alternative natures of ownership which may be
conveyed, the rationale underlying the Hyde decision arguably supports the theory
that Article 1752 applies only to set the bounds within which conventional acts
may be confected, and does not affect rights which arise or are deemed to arise
by operation of law.3 The Hyde analysis is significant in this respect because
of the statutory structure within which the legislature placed Articles 890 and
1752. As noted above, Article 890 is included among the Louisiana Civil Code
provisions dealing with intestacy, while Article 1752 was set forth as a part of
the rules governing conventional acts.3'
This historical analysis of Article 1752 suggests that the 1916 amendment
effected a mere incorporation by reference of the restrictions set forth in the
disposable portion rules of Article 1493. Prior to this amendment, Article 1752
imposed conditions on the right of a spouse with children by a prior marriage to
dispose of property which were more restrictive than those set forth in Article
1493. As amended, however, Article 1752 was completely subsumed by Article
1493, without which it no longer has any independent significance.
A review of the chronological development of Article 890 completes the
analysis. Article 890 is the successor to Article 916, which, as set forth in the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, provided:
In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have left
issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed by
last will and testament, of his or her share in the community property,
Professor Lazarus had come to recognize the hollow ring to Article 1752 as amended in 1916:
As last amended by La. Acts 1916, No. 116, article 1752 increases the disposable portion
under such circumstances to the portion that can be legally given to a stranger, which
portion can be given either "in full property or in usufruct." This phrase is a remnant of
the legislation as first enacted, and is now apparently inconsequential for it merely gives
the donor the right of what he has the faculty of doing anyhow, that is, of disposing of
the disposable portion in any manner he sees fit. It is evident, therefore, that it no longer
makes any difference whether the donor has children by a prior marriage, or whether the
disposition is made to a spouse or to a stranger. The disposable portion will always be
the same in all cases and is limited only by the provisions of articles 1493 and 1494.
l (emphasis added).
33. This analysis finds support in Professor Yiannopoulos' historical review of Article 1752:
In its pre-1916 version, article 1752 contained a rule for the determination of the
disposable portion, in perfect ownership or in usufruct, without reference to any other
articles in the Code. Today, however, article 1752 declares that the testator may give to
his spouse of a second marriage the same portion of his property that he may give to a
stranger.... If the disposition is in perfect ownership, its validity and effect will have
to be determined in the light of article 1493; and if the disposition is in usufruct, its
validity and effect will have to be determined in the light of the option granted to forced
heirs by article 1499.
A.N. Yiannopoulos, Testamentary Dispositions in Favor of the Surviving Spouse and the Legitimte
of Descendants, 28 La. L. Rev. 509, 528-29 (1968). See also Yiannopoulos, supra note 24, at 207.
213, 214, and infra text accompanying notes 52-63.
34. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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the survivor shall hold [in] usufruct, during his or her natural life, so
much of the share of the deceased in such community property as may
be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall cease, however,
whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage."
Article 916. thus established a legal usufruct over so much of the decedent's
share of the community as was inherited by issue of the marriage between the
decedent and his surviving spouse. The 1870 version of Article 916 remained
intact until 1975, when it was amended to authorize the testator to confirm the
Article 916 usufruct for the life of the surviving spouse and to provide that a
usufruct so confirmed would not be an impingement upon the legitime. Article
916, as amended in 1975, thus read as follows:
In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have left
issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed by
last will and testament, of his or her share in the community property,
the survivor shall hold [in] usufruct, during his or her natural life, so
much of the share of the deceased in such community property as may
be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall cease, however,
whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage, unless the
usufruct has been confirmed for life or any other designated period to
the survivor by the last will and testament of the predeceased husband
or wife, and the rights of forced heirs to the legitime shall be subject to
any such usufruct, which usufruct shall not be an impingement upon the
legitime.36
Article 916 was again amended in 1979, when the legislature first authorized
a testator to grant in favor of his surviving spouse a usufruct over his separate
property without thereby impinging upon the legitime:
In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have left
issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed by
last will and testament, of his or her share in the community property,
the survivor shall hold [in] usufruct, during his or her natural life, so
much of the share of the deceased in such community property as may
be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall cease, however,
whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage, unless the
usufruct has been confirmed for life or any other designated period to
the survivor by the last will and testament of the predeceased husband
or wife, and the rights of forced heirs to the legitime shall be subject to
any such usufruct, which usufruct shall not be an impingement upon the
legitime.
35. La. Civ. Code art. 916 (1870). This 1870 version of Article 916 was taken nearly verbatim
from the original version as enacted by Act 152 of 1844.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 916 (1870), as amended by 1975 La. Acts No. 680, § 1.
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Further, a husband or wife may, by his or her last will and
testament, grant a usufruct for life or any other designated period to the
surviving spouse over so much of the separate property as may be
inherited by issue of the marriage with the survivor, and the rights of
forced heirs to the legitime shall be subject to any such usufruct, which
usufruct thus granted shall be treated in the same fashion as a legal
usufruct and not be an impingement upon the legitime 7
The 1979 version of Article 916 authorized the testator to grant a usufruct
in favor of his surviving spouse, both over his share of the community and over
his separate property. The usufruct so authorized, however, was limited to te
portion of such property that was inherited by issue of the marriage between the
testator and the spouse in whose favor the usufruct was created. The 1979
version of Article 916 did not authorize the testator to grant such a usufruct over
property which would be inherited by children of a prior marriage.
A testator was first authorized to grant, in favor of his surviving spouse, a
usufruct over all or any part of his interest in community property, without
regard to whether it would be inherited by issue of his last marriage, in 1981,
when the legislature replaced Article 916 with Article 890.
The original version of Article 890 authorized a testator to confirm for the
life of his surviving spouse (or for a shorter period) the usufruct authorized by
that article over his entire interest in community property.38 While the first
paragraph specifically referred to the confirmation of the legal usufruct in favor
of the surviving spouse "over so much of [the testator's share of community
property] as may be inherited by the [testator's] descendants," the second
paragraph authorized the testator to grant a testamentary usufruct only "over so
much of the separate property as may be inherited by issue of the marriage with
the survivor or as may be inherited by illegitimate children." 9 Thus, unlike the
second paragraph, the first paragraph did not expressly limit the testator's
37. La. Civ. Code art. 916 (1870), as amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 678, § 1.
38. Article 890, as originally enacted by Act 919 of 1981, provided as follows:
If the deceased spouse is survived by descendants, and shall not have disposed by
testament of his share in the community property, the surviving spouse shall have a legal
usufruct over so much of that share as may be inherited by the descendants. This usufruct
terminates when the surviving spouse contracts another marriage, unless confirmed by
testament for life or for a shorter period.
The deceased may by testament grant a usufruct for life or for a shorter period to the
surviving spouse over so much of the separate property as may be inherited by issue of
the marriage with the survivor or as may be inherited by illegitimate children.
A usufruct authorized by this article is to be treated as a legal usufruct and is not an
impingement upon legitime.
If the usufruct authorized by this article affects the rights of heirs other than children
of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving spouse, or affects separate
property, security may be requested by the naked owner.




authority to confirm a usufruct over his interest in community property to that
portion "as may be inherited by issue of the marriage with the survivor."'
Accordingly, the phrase "over so much of that share as may be inherited by the
descendants" appearing in the first paragraph may reasonably be interpreted as
referring to all the testator's descendants without regard to whether they were
issue of his last marriage.4 '
Act 445 of 1982 amended the second paragraph of Article 890 to read as
follows:
The deceased may by testament grant a usufruct for life or for a
shorter period to the surviving spouse over all or part of his separate
property.
42
In particular, the 1982 amendment to Article 890 specifically excised the
language appearing in the second paragraph of the prior version which, by
implication, had denied the testator authority to grant a testamentary usufruct
over his separate property that would be inherited by descendants of a prior
marriage. The deletion, in 1982, of this restrictive language strongly suggests the
legislature's intent to extend the availability of the Article 890 usufruct to all of
a testator's separate property without regard to whether it would be inherited (1)
by issue of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving spouse, (2) by
issue of a prior marriage, or (3) by illegitimates.
This historical review indicates that no conflict existed between the scope of
the surviving spouse's usufruct under former Louisiana Civil Code article 916 and
the rights of children from the testator's prior marriage under Article 1752 until
1981, when Article 916 was replaced by the more expansive Article 890. While
former Article 916 set forth a testator's right to dispose of his property in usufruct
to his surviving spouse, his right to do so was limited to the portion of his estate
which would be inherited by issue of the marriage with that spouse. This was
consistent with Article 1752, which by 1916 had been reduced to a mere expression
of Article 916's negative implication-a testator could not confirm or grant a
usufruct in favor of his surviving spouse over the legitime of children who were not
issue of the marriage. The potential conflict regarding the scope of the surviving
spouse's usufruct thus arose upon the enactment of Article 890, which could be
construed as having extended the usufruct to the legitime of the testator's children
by a prior marriage.4" That the Suggs court sought to avoid this apparent conflict
by disregarding the most recent expression of legislative will, the enactment of
Article 890, is peculiar. In effect, the court breathed new life into Article 1752,
which the legislature had emasculated in 1916. From this review of the histories
40. Id
41. Id.
42. La. Civ. Code art. 890, as amended by 1982 La. Acts No. 445, § 1.




of Article 916, its successor, Article 890, and Article 1752, the authors suggest that
the 1981 and 1982 legislative acts, by which Article 890 was enacted and amended,
completed the implied repeal of the theretofore superfluous Article 1752.
3. Implied Repeal of Article 1752
In finding no conflict between Articles 890 and 1752, the Suggs court
interpreted Article 890 as affecting the interests of a testator's descendants by a
prior marriage only to the extent those interests were part of the disposable portion.
In effect, the court interpreted the words "usufrut authorized by this article,"
appearing in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 890, as excluding the
legitime of children by a prior marriage. The Suggs court thereby gave full effect
to the literal provisions of Article 1752 and, although limiting the effect of the third
and fourth paragraphs of Article 890, avoided treating them as surplusage. The
third paragraph of Article 890 thus would be limited under the Suggs analysis to the
legitime of issue of the marriage between the deceased and the surviving spouse
and of illegitimate issue. The fourth paragraph would apply only to a bequest in
naked ownership of all or a part of the disposable portion in favor of an issue of a
prior marriage.
The Suggs analysis is valid only if, when enacting Article 890, the legislature
intended that Article 1752 operate as a limitation on the availability of the surviving
spouse's usufruct.' The legislative history of Article 890, however, does not
indicate any such intent.45 In fact, the legislative history of Act 919 of 1981 and
Act 445 of 1982 indicates just the opposite.4 A review of this legislative history
thus compels the conclusion that the enactment of Article 890 effected the total
eclipse of Article 1752.
The literal language of Articles 890 and 1752 may be viewed as being in
conflict if the legislature intended the Article 890 usufruct to apply to the legitime
of children by a prior marriage.4 That the legislature intended the usufruct to
extend this far is clear from one of the official comments to the original version of
Article 890, which provided as follows:
44. The Suggs court stated that "[tlhere is nothing in the language of Article 890 to indicate such
intent [to repeal Article 1752 by enactment of Article 8901." Succession of Suggs, 612 So. 2d 297,
299 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992). Aside from examining the language of Articles 1752 and 890, the
Suggs opinion contains no analysis of the legislative history or the legislative intent regarding such
articles.
45. Nor, as noted above, does an analysis of the chronologies of Articles 890 and 1752 indicate
any such intent.
46. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
47. It is well-settled that, in interpreting statutes, courts "should construe an enactment to give
effect to the true legislative intent." Bonnett v. Karst, 261 La. 850, 892, 261 So. 2d 589, 605 (1972).
Accord G.I. Joe, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 561 So. 2d 62, 65 (La. 1990); In re Bruno, 388 So.
2d 784, 786 (La. 1980); Smith v. Flournoy, 238 La. 432, 446-47, 115 So. 2d 809, 814 (1959);
Thigpen v. Boswell, 465 So. 2d 865, 867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Franco v. Kar Products, Inc., 409
So. 2d 1238, 1244 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
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(a) This article includes some aspects of Article 916 of the Civil Code of
1870 but changes the law. It extends the usufruct of the surviving spouse
to allformer community property of the deceased, regardless of whether
the descendants who succeed to the property are issue of the marriage
with the survivor or not. It makes no change in the present law with
reference to the usufruct over separate property, which permits a testator
to grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over so much of the separate
property as may be inherited by issue of the marriage with the survivor. s
This comment constitutes strong evidence of the legislature's specific intent
that the Article 890 usufruct be available even with respect to the inheritance over
which the Article 1752 proscription previously may have extended. It is, therefore,
clear from this comment that the legislature did not intend Article 1752 to limit the
usufruct authorized by Article 890. Further, when considered together with the
1982 amendment to Article 890, one may infer from the 1981 comment that the
legislature intended to authorize a testator to grant, in favor of his surviving spouse,
a usufruct over all or part of his separate property and to permit the usufruct so
created to burden the legitime of all of the testator's descendants, regardless of
whether they were issue of his last marriage. Thus, taken together, the 1981
comment and the 1982 amendment suggest the legislature's intent that the Article
890 usufruct be available with respect to all of the decedent's property, whether
community or separate, and that Article 890 override the limitations which
otherwise would be imposed under Article 1752. Under this interpretation, the
words "usufruct authorized by this article" appearing in the third and fourth
paragraphs of Article 890 would include a usufruct which encumbers the legitime
of heirs who are not children of the marriage between the deceased and his
surviving spouse.49
The Suggs court suggested the enactment of Act 147 of 1990 (later declared
unconstitutional in its entirety in Lauga), which contained an express repeal of
48. La. Civ. Code art. 890 cmt. (a) (emphasis added).
49. Louisiana courts have long recognized that reporter's comments and various other provisions
included in legislative enactments, although not part of the law, are properly considered for purposes
of interpreting statutes so as to determine legislative intent. For example, in Robinson v. North Am.
Royalties, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1384, 1388 (La. App. 3d Cir.), modified, 470 So. 2d 112 (1985) (per
curiam). the court was "compelled to look to the [official reporter's] comment for insight as to the
legislature's intent in enacting Article 128 [of the Mineral Code]." Likewise, in Thigpen v. Boswell,
465 So. 2d 865, 867 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), in interpreting Articles 180-184 of the Mineral Code,
the court was guided by the reporter's comments and declared that "[r]eason dictates that we interpret
the statute in the manner that effectuates the legislature's intent .... " Accord Exchange Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Great Am. Exploration Corp., 789 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1986); Emmons v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 422 n.5, 158 So. 2d 594, 598 n.5 (1963); State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 1006
n.3, 109 So. 2d 896, 898 n.3 (1958), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gatlin, 241 La. 321, 129
So. 2d 4 (1961). Thus, although § 5 of Act 919 of 1981 provides that "[t]he article headnotes and
comments in this Act are not part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion
in this Act," those headnotes and comments nevertheless reflect the legislative intent underlying the
scope and effect of the Article 890 usufruct.
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Article 1752, was evidence that the legislature had not previously intended to repeal
Article 1752. This conclusion ignores the manifest legislative intent set forth in the
1981 revision comment as well as the common legislative practice of repealing so-
called "deadwood" provisions, i.e., statutory provisions which are archaic or
obsolete but which have not been expressly repealed. Legislative bodies, from time
to time, enact legislation which renders earlier statutes archaic or obsolete and later
return to expressly repeal the affected provisions." Further, section 8 of Act 919
of 1981, in providing "[a]ll laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby
repealed," strongly suggests that the legislature (1) made no serious attempt to
review every pre-existing statutory provision of Louisiana law for consistency with
its legislative intent, (2) realized that other previously enacted statutes might well
be in conflict with the extensive statutory revisions made by Act 919,"' and (3)
intended that any and all such previously enacted statutes be repealed to the extent
they were inconsistent with the provisions of Act 919. When read in conjunction
with the official comment to the original version of Article 890 as enacted in 1981,
this provision alone indicates, at least with respect to the testator's interest in
community property, the legislature's intent to repeal Article 1752. From this, it
is only logical to conclude that the 1982 amendment completed the expression of
this intent to effect the total eclipse of Article 1752.
B. Characterization of the Article 890 Usufruct as Legal Versus Testamentary
The error in Suggs can also be identified with the court's failure to consider the
classification of the Article 890 usufruct as legal in nature, as opposed to
conventional.5 2 According to Louisiana Civil Code article 544:
50. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
51. The preamble to Act 919 of 1981 reveals the comprehensive nature of the revisions made by
that act, viz.:
To revise, amend, and reenact the Preliminary Title and Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of Title I of
Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, containing Article 870 through and
including Article 933, relative to kinds of succession and intestate succession, substituting
a new preliminary title and Chapters 1 through 3, to consist of Articles 870 through 902;
to provide for general principles; to provide for the different sorts of successions and
successors; to provide for the privilege of representation; to provide the rules of intestate
succession to community and separate property, including the usufruct rights of a
surviving spouse; to provide for the rights of the state in default of heirs; to amend and
reenact Article 3556(8) of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870; to enact Article 3154.1 of
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure providing for the rights of certain naked owners
of property burdened with the surviving spouse's usufruct to request security; to repeal
all other laws or parts of laws in conflict with this Act; to provide that the article
headnotes and the comments included in this Act are not to be considered as part of the
proposed law; to provide for the severability of the provisions of this Act; to provide that
the provisions of this Act shall prevail over the conflicting provisions of other acts passed
during the 1981 Regular Session; to provide the effective date of this Act.
52. A usufruct created by testament constitutes a conventional usufruct. See infra note 56 and
authorities cited therein. The consequences which attend the characterization of a usufruct as legal
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Usufruct may be established by a juridical act either inter vivos or
mortis causa, or by operation of law. The usufruct created by juridical act
is called conventional; the usufruct created by operation of law is called
legal.5 3
It has long been established that any usufruct authorized by Article 890 is
deemed to arise by operation of law.' This is equally true whether the Article
890 usufruct arises in the intestate setting, is confirmed by testament (in the case
of the testator's interest in community property), or is created by testament (in
the case of the testator's separate property)."5 The purposes of this usufruct
support its characterization as a right arising by operation of law. According to
Professor Yiannopoulos: "The purposes of the usufruct of the surviving spouse,
ever since its introduction into Louisiana law by Act No. 152 of 1844, have been
to secure means of sustenance for the surviving spouse and to prevent partition
or liquidation of the community to the prejudice of that spouse." 6
These stated purposes are equally valid regardless of whether the decedent's
estate is composed of community or separate property or whether he is survived
by children of the marriage with his surviving spouse; by children of a prior
marriage, by illegitimates, or by any combination thereof.5
The first paragraph of Article 890 creates a legal usufruct in favor of the
surviving spouse only with respect to the decedent's interest in community
or conventional are significantly different. For example, the legal nature of the Article 890 usufruct
(1) results in its termination upon the surviving spouse's remarriage (unless confirmed by testament
for life or a shorter period), (2) prevents it from being subject to Louisiana inheritance taxes, (3)
relieves the usufructuary from the obligation to provide security-unless the naked owners are not
children of the marriage, and (4) prevents it from being treated as an impingement upon the legitime
of forced heirs. Essentially the opposite is true with respect to conventional usufructs. See
Yiannopoulos, supra note 21, § 194, at 391-95, and authorities cited therein.
53. The comments accompanying the 1976 revision to Article 544 further provide:
Conventional usufructs are of two kinds: either contractual, created by inter vivos
juridical act, or testamentary, created by mortis causa juridical act. Legal usufructs may
be of various kinds. In Louisiana... the surviving spouse has the usufruct of one-half
of the community property inherited by issue of the marriage ....
La. Civ. Code art. 544 cmt. (b).
54. See, e.g., Succession of Steen, 508 So. 2d 1377 (La. 1987); Succession of Waldron, 323 So.
2d 434 (La. 1975); Succession of Chauvin, 260 La. 828, 257 So. 2d 422 (1972); Winsberg v.
Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 96 So. 2d 44 (1957); Succession of McCarthy, 583 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1991); Darby v. Rozas, 580 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Succession of Daly v.
McNamara, 515 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). This is clear from the face of Article 890, the
third paragraph of which provides: "A usufruct authorized by this Article is to be treated as a legal
usufruct and is not an impingement upon legitime."
55. See cases cited supra note 54.
56. Yiannopoulos, supra note 21, § 189, at 381.
57. In fact, it is reasonable to assume children of a prior marriage would be more likely to seek
a partition than children of the marriage with the surviving spouse because they would not have the
same allegiance or loyalty to the surviving spouse who is not their parent. The purpose of the
usufruct thus may be seen as having even greater validity in this setting.
[Vol. 55
PRACTITIONERS' NOTE
property and provides that this usufruct will terminate when the survivor
remarries. Nevertheless, that paragraph expressly authorizes a testator to confirm
the Article 890 usufruct for life. Further, the second paragraph of Article 890
expressly provides that a testator may grant to his surviving spouse a usufruct
over his separate property. The third paragraph provides that a usufruct
authorized by Article 890, though created or confirmed by testament, is deemed
to be a legal usufruct. Article 890 thus reflects a clear legislative intent to allow
a testator to reach the same result regarding his separate property as would obtain
by operation of law with respect to his interest in community property, and to
permit the surviving spouse's usufruct over property of either character to
continue for her lifetime, should the testator so desire. For example, if no
community exists because the spouses have contractually agreed to dispense with
the community property regime, or if the community is insignificant and the
testator has substantial separate property, the testator may grant a usufruct over
his separate property in order to enable his spouse to maintain her standard of
living without being concerned about the claims of forced heirs." Those claims
can be avoided, however, only by characterizing the usufruct as legal. Thus,
while it may appear somewhat anomalous that the law in certain circumstances
accommodates the creation of a legal usufruct only by an act of donation mortis
causa, which is a conventional act, 9 it is this characterization which gives
effect to a testator's intent to provide for his surviving spouse for as long as he
wishes, unimpeded by the claims of forced heirs. The Suggs construction of
Article 1752 begins to unravel when the Article 890 usufruct is viewed from this
perspective.
58. The same would be true in the case of a testamentary confirmation of the Article 890 usufruct
which attaches to the decedent's interest in community property.
59. Professor Yiannopoulos recognizes this anomaly: "Without such a testamentary disposition,
however, there can be no legal usufruct over separate property." Yiannopoulos, supra note 21, §
189, at 382-83 (emphasis added).
The distinction between legal usufruct and testamentary usufruct has been blurred in
Louisiana by the doctrine of confirmation of the legal usufruct by will. According to the
jurisprudence interpreting Article 916 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, a testamentary
disposition that was not adverse to the interests of the surviving spouse did not defeat the
legal usufruct under that article. Such a disposition merely confirmed the legal usufruct.
The doctrine of confirmation of the legal usufruct by testament had no statutory
foundation until the 1975 amendment to Article 916 of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, it
became deeply imbedded in Louisiana law because it favors strongly the interests of the
surviving spouse. In effect, this doctrine allows the surviving spouse in community to
cumulate rights granted to him directly by law and those given by the will of the deceased
spouse. This doctrine is now a part of the statutory scheme of Article 890 of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
Id § 194, at 392.
Question has arisen whether the confirmation of tie legal usufruct by testament affects the
nature of the usufruct and converts it into testamentary. According to well-settled
Louisiana jurisprudence, when the legal usufruct is confirmed by testament it remains
legal for purposes of taxation, giving of security, and forced heirship.
Id § 195, at 395.
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As noted in detail above, Article 1752 essentially represents a mere limited
restatement of Article 1493, which defines the disposable portion of one's estate.
Article 1752 simply has no significance apart from Article 1493. Because the
express language of Article 890 excepts a usufruct created under that article from
the rules of Article 1493 (i.e., by characterizing the usufruct as legal and by
expressly stating it will not be an impingement on the legitime), any usufruct that
is either created or authorized by Article 890 will, by definition, be free of the
restrictions imposed by Article 1752.'
This result finds support in Professor Yiannopoulos' analysis of the legal
nature of an Article 890 usufruct:
When the testator gives to the surviving spouse his entire estate in
full ownership, the disposition impinges on the legitime of his descen-
dants and must be reduced. The disposition, however, is not adverse to
the interests of the surviving spouse and does not defeat the legal
usufruct.....
• * ' [The usufruct created in Winsberg] attached by operation of
law; hence, it was not an impingement on the legitime of the children.
Winsberg continues to be relevant for the interpretation of Article
890 of the Louisiana Civil Code and the reduction of excessive
donations in favor of the surviving spouse.
6 1
He further noted, with respect to an Article 890 usufruct over the forced portion,
that:
In contrast with the prior law, there is no impingement on the legitime
of descendants when a spouse grants to the surviving spouse a usufruct
over his entire estate, whether consisting of community property, of
separate property, or of both community property and separate
property, and whether the usufruct is for life or for a shorter period.
Such a usufruct is a usufruct authorized by Article 890 of the Louisiana
Civil Code and is to be treated as a legal usufruct.62
Implicit in Professor Yiannopoulos' analysis is the conclusion that the
restrictions imposed by Article 1752 are subject to the rights of a surviving
spouse with respect to an Article 890 usufruct. This conclusion follows because
the surviving spouse whose bequest has been reduced to the disposable portion
receives the Article 890 legal usufruct even with respect to the legitime.
Accordingly, even a forced heir's action for reduction under Article 1502 would
60. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 21, §197, at 400 n.9 (stating that Article 1499 does not apply
to an Article 890 usufruct "because the burden on the legitime is permitted by Article 890 of the
same Code").
61. lId § 196, at 397-98 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
62. Id § 197, at 399 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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be subject to the surviving spouse's usufruct.63 This analysis clearly precludes
any action by which children of the marriage between the decedent and his
surviving spouse might seek to reduce the Article 890 usufruct over either
community or separate property. The same result should obtain in the case of
an action for reduction brought by children of a prior marriage to enforce the
restrictions set forth in Article 1752. Because an action based upon a violation
of Article 1752 may be construed only with reference to the rights of forced
heirs in general under Article 1493, it is clear that Article 890, which is an
essential element of the Article 1493 definition of the disposable portion, by
implication also qualifies the scope of the rights afforded by Article 1752. One
simply struggles in vain for a reason to restrict this analysis to an action for
reduction brought by children of the marriage.
II. CONCLUSION
The analysis applied by the Suggs court disregards both the nature of the
Article 890 usufruct and the legislative and judicial history behind that article
and Article 1752. The analysis suggested here, which incorporates these factors,
compels a contrary conclusion and, coincidentally, reaffirms the availability of
the federal estate tax marital deduction regarding both (1) a testamentary
confirmation for life of the usufruct established by the first paragraph of Article
890 and (2) a testamentary granting of the usufruct authorized by the second
paragraph of that article, irrespective of whether the property so affected may
constitute the legitime of the testator's descendants by a prior marriage.
63. It is significant to note that the rights of reduction with which forced heirs are possessed are
set forth in Book Ill, Title II of the Louisiana Civil Code, dealing with donations inter vivos and
mortis causa; they are not contained within Book III, Title 1, dealing with intestate successions, as
is Article 890. Louisiana Civil Code article 1502 provides, in pertinent part: "Any disposal of
property ... exceeding the quantum of which a person may legally dispose to the prejudice of the
forced heirs, is not null, but only reducible to that quantum."
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